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In 
The Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
HYDE PAR.K TO'\~X, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
G-EORGE CHA~fBERS AND 
1, .A C Y CHAMBERS, His 
Wife, E. S. CHAMBERS, a 
Single· Man, BERTHA POUL-
SEN, as Guardian of ADELL 
IDA POULSEN, a Minor, 
DAVID J. WEEKS, and 
}fARY WEEKS, His Wife, 
Defendants and Respondent~. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant is a Municipal Corporation or-
ganized under and exi·sting by virtue of the laws 
of the State of Utah, and situated in Cache County, 
Utah. 
About the year 1911, the appellant, being with-
;out a municipal water system, •entered into an oral 
eontract with the Smithfield Irrigation Company. 
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By means of this contract, the right to use water 
from a certain spring in Birch Creek Canyon was 
granted by Smithfield Irrigation Company, a mu-
tual irrigation company. The Town constructed a 
:Pipe - line to convey the water from this spring 
in Birch Creek Canyon in a general south or south-
westerly direction to a reservoir situated at a 
slightly higher elevation than the Town. 
The pipe-line thus constructed w.as made of 
clay tile pipe, .and wa:s a gravity line. For thi~ 
reason, it was necess.ary to follow the contour of 
the uneven surface of the lands over 'vhich it 
passed. The lands of the· respondent·s were crossed 
hy this pipe-line in the course of its route to the 
l"eservoir. It was necessary for the Town to ac-
quire a right of way .across each of these lands, and 
in consideration of the grant of this right of wa.y 
the Town orally granted each of said re·spondents 
a tap on their respective lands. These taps, con-
n0cted with the water system of the appellant, 
flowed a constant dripping -stream and this stream 
was used by the resp·ective land owners for culinary 
purposes and for stock-watering purposes. None 
of the r~spondents ever resided on his lands at any 
time after said taps were installed, so that by 
''culinary uses'' it is meant only that the \Vater 
was used for drinking purpose·s while the men were 
working on their lands. The oral agreement did 
not mention a.nv time limit nor 'vas there any dis-
cus~ion of any ~ther consideration for the· granting 
(of these tap·s, except only the. grant of the right of 
way. 
The lands of the respondents are userl princi-
pally for pasturage, although possibly a little of 
the land is farmed. It is largely mountainoug 
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or side-hill land. There is no eYidence tending to 
show the numb~r of animals grazed on the Chain-
hers' land, and there is little or no evidence to show 
the number grazed from year to year on the 'Veeks' 
Jand. The latter did, ho,veYer, te·stify that during 
the year 1939 he kept some 25 or 26 animals there ; 
but no proof -was introduced as to "~hether or not 
this was the number which he ha.d ordinarily kept 
there. 
\\ithin a year or two after the original pipe·-
line was eonstructed, the springs proved inadequate 
and the pipe-line was then extended a short dis-
tance up Birch Creek Canyon, in an attempt to tap 
another small spring area; both springs being 
used. Some years later, this was repeated and the 
Town tapped a third spring, using all three. About 
1916, the line wa:s extended further up Birch. Creek 
Canyon and an additional spring tapped; all of the 
spring areas being used by the Town~ 
Notwithstanding these additional sources, the 
water supply proved very inadequate and along 
about the year 1935, a large spring ·situated several 
miles up Birch Creek Canyon, was tapped. At 
that time appellant entered into a new contract with 
Smithfield Irrigation Company, thus securing the 
waters it now uses in the amount of one-half c. f. s. 
(Amended Answer, Ab. 19; Finding of Fact No. 
15, Ab. 87-88). 
During all this period of time, the re·spondents 
used their taps. They paid no rentals of anv kind 
'to the Town. Shortlv after this. the Town decided 
tl1at jt was npcessar~ to re-plac~ the old pipe-line 
with a new pipe-lin~ .. for the rea~on that the old 
ripe-line leaked and wa'R very wasteful. This new 
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pipe-line was constructed in the same general route 
as the old line, but being a pressure pipe, it no 
longer followed the contours of the land, but :went 
in a nearly straight course. Thus in the lands be· 
longing to the respondents, pa,rt of the time it fol-
lowed the same course, but often left it, cutting out 
curves .and bends . 
About the year 1887, the respondents ~Veeks, 
homesteaded the lands belonging to him, and about 
that time he built a house on the lands. He con-
;.;;tructed a ditch called the Lower Ditch, which had 
its source in the same springs as the originan source 
of the town's pipe-line. This ditch conducted water 
to the lower end of his land. He lived on the land 
while he was required to) do s'o for hom·e·ste.ad pur-
po·ses, then he left the place and moved to Smith-
field and has never resided there since. This was 
about the year 1896. Shortly before he left his 
land, he constructed what was known:·as the Upper 
Ditch. This ditch had its source in Birch Canyon, 
som.e 160 rods above the Hyde Park intake. It con-
ducted water for ·stock-watering and irrigation pur-
poses to the lands~.helonginig to~ the respondents, and 
this water wa·s used by each of the respondents in 
connection with others. It was what is known a.s a 
High-Water right, and as soon as the stream in 
Birch Canyon receded from it~ ·sprin~ flow, no more 
'va.te·r \vas permitted to run through this ditch for 
irrigation purposes; but it is claimed that a small 
amount passed through the- ditch and wa.s used for 
Rtoek-watering purposes, etc., during the greater 
part of the season. 
The respondents never used the lower ditch 
:after the upp~er ditch was con·stn1cted. 'The upper 
'ditch is still in use for irrigation purposes, but of 
course, it is still a High-W.ater right and no water 
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flows in it after the High_:"\Yater st:ason ends. Re-
spondents testified that as soon u~ they got the tap 
·water, they found that it was superior 'to the culi-
nary ,vater w·hich they had previously conducted 
through the upper ditch and they, therefore, aban-
doned their culinary stream. They do not claim 
that this abandonment was induced by the Town of 
Hyde Park, or any of its official8, but \Yas due 
soJely to the fact that they preferred the tap water. 
Respondents 'Seemed to take the position that be-
cause of their abandonment of the culinary stream 
conducted through the upper ditch, they cannot be 
placed in status quo if the Town refuses to supply 
them longer with tap water. This abandonment 
wa:s voluntary on their part, and not induced by 
appellant. 
Mter the construction of the new pipe-line, the 
Town permittEd its old pipe-line to remain in place 
and ofier('d to give this pipe-line to the\ respondents 
if they wished to accept it. The dripping stream 
in each of the taps in question passed through a 
-small hole in a cap screwed to the end of a hlaf-inch 
pipe and some controversy grew up between th~ 
appellant and respondents, due to the claim of the 
appellant that the respondents greatly enlarged th(' 
holes in the caps and at times r~moved the caps er--
tirely, thus causing much more water to flow through 
the taps than originally contemplated. Respond-
.ents claim that these acts, if done at all, were not 
done by them, but were done by hunters and other 
peoplP coming to the taps for a drink of water. 
Be that as it may, some irritation developed~ becausP 
of the claim of appellant that the respondents wasted 
considerable water. When the appellant con-
structed thiR new pinP-line it did not permit r.e ... 
~pond{\nts to construct taps in its ne'v line. Some 
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\vas so pronounced that at times some of the citi-
zens could not obtain a drink. 
ASSIGNMENT 3 
Findin.g No. 10 is clearly error. All of the 
(:.Vidence including the contracts in evidence, show 
that the Town was the ·owner of one-half a cubic 
foot per second, instead of one and one-half as 
found by the court. This may have been only a 
typographical error; but it should be corrected. 
ASSIGNMENT 4 
Assignment Four is subject to the s.ame obser· 
va.tions as we made in our argument on Assign-
ment No. 2. 
ASSIGNMENT 5 
The Finding No. 13, wherein the court found 
that the "defendants and their predeces·sors in in· 
terest conveyed a portion of the water of Birch 
~re·ek to_the Town of H)llde P'ark for culinarY. pur-
poses'' is totally and entirely unsupported by the 
evidence. Mr. Weeks, the only witness te·stifying 
~n this matter, said (Ab. 86) that the only thing he 
gave the Town was a. right of way. It is true he 
said that "after he got the culinary water from 
!plaintiff's system, he abandoned the culinary sys-
tem he had in the upper ditch.'' He did not claim 
that the Town of Hyde Park used, or could 
11 Sf\ this 'vater so abandoned. Presumably, it 
flo,vPcl down Birch Creek, a live stream, to the 
hf\nefit of Smithfield Irrigation Company, the owner 
of the stream. 
Hyde Park obtained its waters from springs 
tr~1 1ntary to Birch Cr00k, and not. from Birch Creek 
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itself; hence, the increase in the size of the stream 
in Birch Creek, if it "·ere increased by this aban-
donment, "rould not benefit Hyde Park, but 
would benefit the Irrigation Company. This aban-
donment "~as not made at the request of Hyde Park 
or any of its officers, but was n1ade voluntarily by 
the defendants after the right of way W'<l·~ given to 
the Town and he had found the advantag·es of using 
the water from the pipe-line . 
..._-\.SSIGN":MENT 6 
We have already called the attention of 'the 
Court to the fact that the pleadings -and the evi-
dence show that defendants were not supplied with 
water during any part of the year 1939 ; henc.e, this 
finding that the plaintiff ha·s supplied the defend-
ants with water ''ever since 1911'' must be error. 
ASSIG~""1IENT 7 
There is no evidence to support the court's 
finding ''that ever since said year 1911 the·se de·-
fendants have openly, continuously, adversely and 
under claim of right, used the said taps and the 
water flowing therefrom for the purpose of human 
consnmptiojn. and watering their livestock, in an 
amount of about 300 gallons per day.'' 
AU the evidence shows that the u·se by defend-
ants was pennissive and with the· consent of plain-
tiff, ·and hence the use could not be ·adverse. The 
right would depend on contract (if ·there was any 
c·ontract) and not on adverse possession. We will 
discuss this further, hereinafter. Then, the finding 
is not supported, because of another fact. There 
is no evioence whatso0 ver as to the amount used 
by d~f~ndants. 'V eeks said he had enough to run 
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1down a corn row. (Ab. 29). He did not say how 
long the corn row was. There was no other quan-
tity testified to. The defendants, and each of. them, 
lived in Smithfield and did not live on their !lands. 
They say they watered cattle at the taps, and ,drank 
the water when they worked on their lands. There 
was'no p~roof as to the .number of cattle pastured 
by either of the ~defendants, and the amount found 
iby the court (300 g1allons)l i·s based on no evidence 
whatsoever. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
any use is made of the water during the winter 
season, yet the court required the taps to run all 
year. ;This would ·seem to be a clear case of waste~ 
In any event, it finds no support in the evidence. 
ASSIGNMENT 8 
We have previously, under Assignment No. 5. 
considered the facts showing that this a:ssignment 
is well taken. 
ASSIGNMENT 9 
It would seem obvious that Finding No. 21 is 
a conclusion, rather than a finding of ultimate 
facts. 
ASSIGmfENT 10 
We have called the attention of the Court to 
the fact that there rs no evidence that .Plaintiff ben-
efitted fro1n the abandonment by defendants (if they 
!did so abandon) of their water rights. Nor were 
1__hey abandoned at the request of the plaintiff I 
Plaintiff then would have no duty to restore de-
fendants to the statns quo I The rightf; of plaintiff 
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in this ca-se do not dep~nd on such a restoration. 
\\"'" e ·will discuss this hereinafter. 
ASSIGNMENT 11 
It is clear that this is not a finding of any fact, 
but is a conclusion of la"~ drawn by the court from 
other facts . 
ASSIG~~ENT 12 
This assignment can best be considered later in 
connection with other assignments. 
ASSIGN1IEXTS 13 AND 14 
It is- self-evident that no court can determine 
the amount of water required to supply defendants' 
cattle, without determining how many cattle belong-
ing to defendants, require water. The court failed 
to make f any such :findings ; hence, its fin rung that 
the defendants are each entitled to 300 gallons per 
day for human consumption, and sufficient to water 
the livestock of each defendant, is not I?a:sed on 
evidence. The defendants do not live on their 
lands, and the court did ~at find the number of 
cattle to be supplied. 
ASSIG~T).IENT 15 
This assignment is best considered later, in 
connection with others. 
ASSIGNMEKTS 16, 17, 18 A~D 19 
These assignments are best considered later, 
like~se. -
The assig11ments not discussed above \vill no\v 
b~ discussed together. 
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The de·eree ;entered in this case is based on 
the general assumption by !the court that the oral 
;agreement between plaintiff and defendants, or 
their predeeessors in interest, is now' a valid and 
·subsisting agreement and perpetual in its duration. 
The only testimony on this matter was by Mr. 
\Veeks (Ab. 31-32), and Mr. Toolson (Ab. 38) the 
predecessor of Chambers. Weeks said he agreed 
to give a right of waY' for the tap. No ·statement 
'vas made as to duration of the contract. Mr. 
\To olson testified to similar facts. The court in-
terpreted this agreement to be1 perpetual. This in-
terpreta.tion is erroneous. The. proner construction 
of suchl a contract is that it is terminable at will. 
Thus, where a .city agreed to perpetually sup-
tply a land-owner with! w.ater. to operate his toilets, 
free of charge, in .exchange: for the right granted to 
the city to lay its sewer pipe·s across the land-
owner's land, it was held that such a contract was 
null and void and ultra vires, and could be termi-
nated by the city. This was because: the city had 
no power to enter into perpetual contracts. The 
ca·se also held that notwithstanding the city still 
continued to use the sewer, it ,va.s not estopped 
from repudiating the contract. 
Horkan v. City of ·Moultrie (Ga.) 71 S. E. 
785. 
The Court in the above ca~c has0d its ruling on 
the fact that it would be nnfnir to let one council 
l)inrl future ones in such a "1'a~r that they could not 
fix equal unifor1n water rates from time to time. 
Thus, also~ a ri o-ht oorPntPcl to a \Vater company 
1-o use the streets of 1BoisP without stating any 
limit of time, for the pnrpO'se of constructing water 
mains to he USP.d in snpplyin.g the inhabitants of 
the rity V\7ith cnUn:-1 ry "'"ater, "ra~ l1Pld to be n mPr·e 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
license, terminable at will. The Court also held 
that the officers 'vere not estopped to set aside a 
void agreement. 
Boise Citv v. Boise Etc. Co. 186 Fed 705 
. . 
Cert. Denied ~20 U.S. 616, Appeal 
Dismissed, 230 lT. S. 98. 
This ruling was placed upon the ground that a per. 
petual contract cannot be granted by a city, and if 
attempted to be granted, the contract is terminable 
at will. 
The city; agreed to levy a tax of five cents on 
the dollar perpetually, and pay the money so raised 
to a water company in order to obtain a water 
supply. This was held void on the ground that such 
a perpetual contract was ultra vires and void. 
Westminster Water Co. v. Westminster, 98 
l\ld. 551; 56 Atl. 990; 64 L.R.A. 630. 
~-\_ city and a street railway company entered 
into a contract to construct an overhead crO'ssing, 
each to pay a portion of the costs. The contract 
required the city to keep the crossing in repair per-
petually. The law of the State required the rail-
road company to maintain crossings, and this con-
tract was intended to change this requirement for 
the reason th~t the viaduct was much more expen-
'3ive than \Ya~ necessary for railroad purposes. The 
Coul"t he1d that the contract which purported to 
pPrpetuallv bind the citv to as·sume the duties of 
the railro~d company, w~s ultra vires and void. 
State of Minnesota ex rei. St. Paul v. Min-
nesota, Etc. Co. 80 Minn. 108, 83 N. W. 
32 ; 50 L. R . A. 656. 
A devise to build n hospital providing that the 
rounty would support and maintain the hospital 
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perpetually, was he1d invalid for the reason that 
the County ~could)) not bind itself perpetually to 
support the hospital. 
Robbins v. Hoover ·etal. 50 Colo. 610; 
115 P. 526. 
These ca·ses seem to make it clear that Hyde 
Park did not have the power to barter away the 
rights of its citizens for .all future time, as co:P.-
tended for by respondents. And, also, the Court 
should construe ·such contracts as subject to being 
terminated at will. Clearly, Assignments of Error 
Numbers 15 to 20, inclusive, are well taken. 
We have already called the attention of the 
Court to th;e fact the only consideration for the 
grant to the defendants of the right to use. the water 
flowing from the tap·s, was the .grant of a right of 
way for the pipe-line. This was clearly a "sale" 
or ''exchange'' of water rights for a grant of right 
of way, and is in violation of the provisions of 
our Constitution. · 
Section 6, Article XI, Constitution of Utah 
reads a:s follows : 
''No municipal corporation shall · directly 
or indirectly lease, sell, alien or dispose of 
any waterworks, water rights, or sources 
of water ·supply now, or hereafter to be 
owned or controlled bv it· but all such 
"' ' 
waterworks, water rights and sources of 
water supply now owned or hereafter ac-
quired by any municipal corporation, shall 
be preserved, maintained and op·erated by 
it for supplying its inhabitants with water 
at reasonable charges: Provided, that no-
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thing herein contained shall be construed 
to preYent any such n1unicipal corporation 
from exchanging " .. ater rights, or sources 
of w·ater ·supply, for other "·ater rights or 
sources of water supply of equal Yalue, and 
to be devoted in like manner to the public 
supply of its inhabitants.'' 
No sale of water rights is .ever permitted, and 
an exchange can be made only for water rights of 
equal value. The plaintiff purchased the only 
waters it owns, or has e\er owned, in Birch Canyon 
or in any of the springs tributary thereto, from 
Smithfield Irrigation Company, and obtained none 
from defendants or their )predecessors in inte:est. 
It is generally held that prohibitory provisions 
such as the one quoted above, are self-executing, 
and that an act done in violation: of these provisions 
is void. 
11 Am. Jr. at Page 695, Note 13; 12 
C. J. 731, Note 63. 
Being a creature of statute, a municipal cor-
poration possesses such power, and such power 
only, as the State confers upon it. Subject at all 
tllnes to constitutional limitations, the legislature 
n1ay confer upon such corporations ·such power as 
it sees fit. 
43 C.J. 176. 
Municipal corporations are subject to the lim-
itations of both State and Federal Constitutions. 
43 C.J. 225. 
Parties contracting with a municipality must 
take notice of its powers. If it goes beyond its 
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po~·ers, ·the parties so contracting, do so at their 
peril. 
Cobb v. City, 179 Okla. 126; 64 Pac. (2d) 
901. 
Ryan v. Thomast(Arizona) 53 Pac (2d) 
863. ! 
Utah Rapid Trrursit Co. v. Ogden City, 
89 U. 546 ; 58 Pac. ( 2d) 1. · 
News Etc. v. Carbon County (Utah) 72 
Utah 88; 269 Pac. 129. 
On the question of the effect of .acquiesence 
in a given situation, or fin the performance of an 
agreement, over a long p,eriod of time, see: 
San Francisco v. Itsell. 80 Cal. 57; 22 
Pa.c. 74. 
This case was appealed to the ·Supreme Court 
of the United State·s and the appeal dismissed; s·ee 
10 S.Ct. 24; 133 U.S. 65; 32 L.Ed. 570. 
We come now to a ·consideration of the Utah 
cases involving sales and exchanges of water by 
municipal corporations. 
Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River 'Vater 
·V\T orks.·& Irrigation Company, 16 Utah 
440; 52 Pa.c. 697. 
This case came before our Suprem.e Court in 
1898, two years after the adoption of the Utah Con-
stitution. It involved a controversy and a ·consid-
eration of questions ateda.ting the adoption of the 
Constitution; hence, the prohibitory provi·sion was 
not referred to in the opinion. The case simply 
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held that the provisions of the charter of a. city 
must be strictly construed. Provisions authoriz-
ing the city to lease, convey, and dispose of prop-
,~l1y, botli real and personal, for the benefit of the 
city, the case held, did not authorize the city to 
lea'Se or otherwise transfer its "~aterworks system, 
or: its water right used in supplJing its inhabitants 
with water, and that in ord-er to authorize such a 
sale or transfer the charter would, of neeessity, 
hav-e to ·specifically authorize that specific act. 
State Ex rei Ellerbeck v. Salt Lake 'City, 
29 Utah 361; Sl Pac. 273. 
This case was decided on June 24, 1905. It 
involved the application for a writ of prohibition 
restraining Salt Lake City and its officers from is-
suing, negotiating or selling certain municipal bonds 
i:;;sued by the city for the purpose, among other 
things, of procuring a permanent and adequate in-
crease in tlie water supply of the city. The muni-
pality had entered into an agreement with certain 
farmers for the exchange of its Utah Lake R~eser­
voir water for mountain water which could be used 
for culinary purposes. It wa·s contended that the 
exchange wa:s not valid, because of the fact that the 
irrigation water was greater in quantity than the 
mountain water which the city received in exchange 
therefor. 
The Court had before it the quc;stion of ex-
change referred to in the Utah Constitution. It 
held that the exchange was valid, even though there 
was a disparity in the quantity, the value of the 
·water being equated by the superior quality of that 
received frotn the farmers. This case ·simply con-
~ trues a provision of the Constitution ,vhich in and 
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of itself is clear and, it would seem, needs no judi-
cial construction. 
Brummit v. Water Works Co. 33 Utah 285; 
93 Pac. 829. 
This case was decided on February 2, 1908~ 
::1nd had to do with the contract_ involved in the case 
of Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River'·Water Works 
& Irrigation Company, ·supra. So far as its appli-
cation to the facts of the instant cas.e are concerned 
the syllabus (17) reflects the holding of the Court. 
It reads: 
'' W at.ers - Public Water Supply- Right 
of City to Dispose of· ·Water Rights-
Constitutional Provisions - Constitution, 
Art. 11, Section 6, provides that no muni-
cipal corporation· shall directly or indi-
rectly lease any water rights or ·sources of 
wa.ter supply controlled by' it, but all such 
rights, etc. shall be preserved, maintained 
and operated by it for supplying its inhab-
itants with water at rea:sonable charges; 
provided that nothing herein contained 
shall he construed to prevent an exchange 
of water rights or sources of water supply 
for others of .equal value, and to be devoted 
in like manner to the public supply of its 
inhabitants. Prior to the time the consti-
tution went into effect, a city had made a 
contract purporting to lease certain water 
rights to 'one who a.gre·ed to construct and 
operate a system of waterworks to sup'{)ly 
tl1e city, etc., under which: the les·see was to 
furnish certain free water to the city. 
After the Constitution was ado-pted, the 
r.itv pa.s~Prl an ordinance regulating its re-
lations with the companv which succeeded 
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to the rights of the le-ssee in ""hich sonte 
changes in rate·s, etc .. "·ere n1ade, and this 
ordinance granted to the con1pany the use 
of the water rights for a tern1 of fifty years 
as a part of the arrangement; but the city 
was still to receive considerable 'vater for 
public purpos-es free of charge. 
Held, that the ordinance was in effect a 
mere continuance of the former contract, 
and the disposition of the city's 'vater 
right was valid.'' 
' This case makes it clear that neither it nor the 
·ease of '":Ogden City '· Bear Lake & River Water 
\\orks & Irrigation Company, supra, were decided 
under the constitutional provision above mentioned: 
that both were expressly decided on a state of facts 
antedating the enactment of the Constitution. 
Genola To~ v. Santaquin City et al. 96 
Utah 88; 80 Pac. (2d) 930. 
Thi·s Court held that in the Genola ·case there was 
an actual exchang-e of water, and the case was sus-
stained on that theory. The Court did not hold that 
water rights might be exchanged for other property 
such as rights of way. 
If there is any doubt a:s to the holding in the 
Gtnola case, v."'"e cite the opinion of the Court on the 
petition for rehearing. See 
Genola Town v. Santaquin, 96 Utah 104; 
85 Pac. (2d) 790. 
There the Court made it verv clear that it expresslv 
held that a municipality m~y not dir·ectly or indi-
rectly sell, alienate or dispose of any of its water 
rights, and that it may only exchange some of its 
rights ''hen 1 t.he value of the use of- the water re-
eeived i~ ~qual to the value of the use of the water 
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with which the city has parted. The ruling on. the 
petition for rehearing is short and concise. We 
r~spectfully direct the Court's attention to it. 
Throughout the proeeedings in the case at bar, 
from time to time, counsel for defendants contended 
that the plaintiff was estopped to repudiate the 
1agreement of 1911 and from seeking refuge behind 
the constitutional provision. We refer to the orig-
inal Genola Town case, 
96 Utah 88; 80 Pac. (2d) 930. 
In the concluding paragraph the Court deal·s with 
the question of estoppel in the following language: 
''While in some cases a party may be es-
topped from taking advantage of the un-
constitutionality of an Act ( Tite v. State 
Tax Co~ission, 89 Utah 404; 57 Pa.c. (Zd): 
734) the· representatives of a municipality 
must act within their powers, and the. city 
cannot be estopped from declaring its own 
acts~ as unconstitutional.'' 
See to same effect : 
Horkan v. City of Moultrie (Ga.) 71 S.E. 
785, supra. 
Boise City v. Boise, etc. Co., 186 Fed. 
- 705, supra .. 
In the lates~t }yolume of· A1nerican Law Re-
ports (Volume 122 A.L.R. 1370), under an an-
notation dealing with the right of .a municipality 
to enforce a contract which was in ·exces'S of the 
municipality's power, we find the following state-
ment of the principle of law under consideration. 
We quote the following from pa.ge 1371: 
''The doctrine of ultra vires has, with goon 
reason, been applied with greater strictnes·s 
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to municipal bodies than to priYate corpora-
tions; and in general a municipality is not 
estopped from denying the validity of a 
contract made by its officers, 'vhere ~here 
has been no authority for making such a 
contract. Thus it is generally held that 
when a contract has been entered into by 
a municipal corporation 'vith respect to a 
subject matter which "ra,s not ""itihn its 
corporate powers, the corporation cannot 
be held liable on the contract whether or 
not the other party thereto ha~ fully car-
ried out lris part of the agreement. This 
rule has reference to the liability of the 
municipality on its ultra Yires contracts 
when sued by the other party to the con-
tract.'' 
In the Genola case, the Supreme Court exer-
cised its equitable powers to require performance 
of a contract which· the Court itself held wa:s a 
valid exchange of water rights. The fact that the 
Court gave as an added reason for . enforcing the 
contract, its disinclination to "make for naught a· 
large portion of Genola 's expenditures and delay 
the benefits of them,'' is wholly immaterial to thE' 
actual holding of the case. Had there been no ex-
rhange of water, would it now be contended that, 
because of the -expenditures of Genola, the courts 
would still be of a disposition to enforce specific 
performa-nce 1 The answer to thi·s is that no court 
would enforce a void contract because of any 
equitable consideration. 
On more than on~ occasion WP were reminded 
hv counsel that thp Town of Hvde P.ark was en-
c1Pavorin!!' to evad~ the nBrform.flnce of ~n agree-
lnent solemnlv enter0.(1 into in 1q1J ann which. for 
a numbP.r of years, wa.s faithfully carried out. 
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Such reminder is wholly be·side the point. If, In 
fact, the Town was, under the express provisions 
of the Constitution, prohibited from selling to 
defendants a portion of its water ·supp~ly, we are 
unable to see why it must forev:er .act unlawfully 
and continue to carry out the terms of the invalid 
agreement, even though it had done s.o .for a num. 
her of years. 
The defendants, as a matter of law, must be 
held to have. had knowledge that the execution of 
the agreement wa·s not . within the powers of the 
Town. They· had no right to expect tha1t it would 
forever he carried out. On the contrary they must 
have a.ssumed tha.t at sometime the officers of the 
municipality would do their duty and repudiate th.P 
invalid agreement. 
Neither can it avail defendants anything to say 
Jhat the quantity of water claimed by them con-
stituted but. a .very small porlion of Hyde Park's 
•supply. If the Town had the right to s·ell a small 
stream, it also had the right to sell a larger one. 
rrhe question of quantity cannot influence the case 
:one way or the other. This was made clear in the 
G enola case, ·supra. On page 935 of the original 
opinion, ! 80 Pacific ( 2d) 930, the court recogmized 
the right of a city to sell its surplus water, even to 
outsiders, provi,ded the sale "ras made in the same 
manner that it sells water to its own inhabitants, 
and provided also that 'the sale was not made in 
'perpetuity. lJnder the prohibition found in the 
(~onstitution, the court sa,id a municipality was not 
permitted to alienate its water even though the 
alienee "'"'as another worthy community or person, 
such, as it 'Yill br contended, and such as we are 
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willing to admit, the defendants are in the instant 
taSe. \\~ e quote the follo,ving language: 
••.A city may sell its excess wat€r to out-
siders. Such is not a sale of its water 
sources or water rights but "·ater fron1 its 
'System in the manner it sells to its citiz·en~. 
But may it obligate itself to deliver a def-
inite amount in perpetuityf \Ye think·thi~ 
agreement is, in effect, a parting with its 
water right pro tanto. \\ e see no real dif~ 
ference in parting with a water right which 
yields 100 gallons per minute by transfer 
and obligating one's self to deliver from 
a water right 100 gallons per minute in 
perpetuity. Sec .. 6, ~-\rt. 11, should not be 
narrowly or strictly construed. It was 
meant to secure to communities their "\Yater 
systems and prohibit any sale or lea·se to 
private parties. This ig one project which 
the Constitution decreed should be kept in 
social ownership by the community. ·Where 
another town or community needing 'vater 
would be the beneficiary of a total or par-
tial alienation of water rights or sources. 
especially where the g-ranting community 
had an excess supply was perhaps not really 
jntended to be prohibited, yet- the language 
is definite that it shall not be aliena.ted 
and does not exclude the case where the 
alienee is another worthy communjty. We 
see no escape, therefore, from the proposi-
tion that under the a~eement th~ City ".,.ag, 
in effect, par6ng' pro tanto with its water 
rights.'' 
The Genola case wa~s decided on the rlefinite 
proposition that the ag-reement between the two 
towns involved an exchange of water. This brought 
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it within the exception contained in the constitu-
tional provision. 
In conclusion, we wish to make one specific 
reference to kssignment of Error No. 19 in the 
instant case. Paragraph two of the decree, after 
naming the defendants, contains the following 
. . prOVISIOn: 
'' . . . . are each entitled to the use of a 
tap connected with the plaintiff's pipe-line 
to supply the sai·d defendants and their 
·successors in interest with sufficient cul-
inary water for human consumption and 
stock-watering purposes for the same num-
ber of domestic animals heretofore · habit-
ually kept on said respective premise's, the 
said human consumption from each of said 
taps to not exceed 300 gallons per tap per 
day.'' 
This provision i·s too indefinite to be per-
fonned. There are no human beings residing on 
either of said lands. No water is used except in 
the summer. Why should the court ·say not to ex-
ceed "300 gallons'' for this useT No attempt was 
made to fix the number of cattle nor the amount 
they would require. Such a odecree is too indefinite 
to stand. 
33 c. J. 1103. 
Hand v. ·Twin Faits County, 40 Idaho 638, 
236 Pac. 936. 
Sharp v. ·Whitmore, 51 U. 14, 168 P. 273. 
Herdy v. Beaver County Irr. Co., 65 U. 28, 
234 P. 524. 
Respectfully submitted 
YOUNG & BIDJLEN, AND 
lR.VINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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